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As with others in the region, America’s three closest allies in the Asia-Pacific, namely Japan, Australia, and South Korea, have all faced asimilar question over the past decade: what threat does China’s
military modernisation pose? Tokyo, Canberra, and Seoul have had to face
an added wrinkle, however, as all three are forced to simultaneously calcu-
late the strength and even the likelihood of future security guarantees
from the United States.
Despite the similarities of the three economically developed democra-
cies with close trade ties to China and a military alliance with the US, each
has responded to China’s military modernisation differently. Given its prox-
imity and a recent history of encounters with an aggressive People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA), Japan’s reaction has been the most direct, altering its
defence posture and investing in capabilities to defend its maritime inter-
ests. Australia has taken a similar approach, though its focus on the “China
threat” is more recent and the resulting military adjustments are still un-
folding. South Korea, on the other hand, is almost completely preoccupied
by the North Korean threat and has only recently begun to consider the
challenges posed by the PLA.
At the same time, all three allies have opted to strengthen ties with the
US military, seeing this as the best – and cheapest – way to defend their
national interests. Both Japan and South Korea are in the midst of basing
adjustments designed to ensure a long-term American presence, and Aus-
tralia recently announced enhanced US access to its military facilities in
hopes of shoring up US military presence in the region. All three nations
have also reached out to other potential regional partners, including each
other but also India, Singapore, and Indonesia. 
In this paper, we discuss the various reactions in Japan, Australia, and
South Korea to the modernisation of the PLA. We explore the diverse per-
spectives in these countries, including official responses, military reactions,
academic writings, and public opinion. By examining the different strands of
thinking, we demonstrate that there is no uniform response to the Chinese
military in any of the three countries. Even within these countries, opinions
and reactions are subject to change based on other factors, such as politics
and economics. The only common thread that can be identified is a trend
of increasing concern about China’s military, although no group in any
country believes there is a high likelihood that Beijing will use force.
The long-term effects of China’s military modernisation on the Asia-Pa-
cific are unclear, but the potential fault line between China and the US has
already begun to emerge. Although the governments of Japan, Australia, and
South Korea hope that US-Chinese strategic competition can be controlled,
each nation finds itself clearly aligned with the United States – though, de-
pending on the success or failure of their current strategic reactions to the
growth of the PLA, in a crisis that alignment may become murkier.
Japan
China’s military modernisation and the increasing incursions of the PLA
Navy (PLAN) in waters close to Japan have prompted a shift in emphasis
from the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) to the Maritime Self Defence
Force (MSDF) and a strengthening of ties with the United States, Australia,
and South Korea – all accomplished without increased defence spending.
A growing number of Japanese fear that the PLA’s acquisition of enhanced
long-range operational capabilities will embolden China to look beyond
Taiwan and its immediate environs, a scenario that could entail more fre-
quent incursions into Japanese waters. More alarmist opinions contend
that China may be seeking control of the ocean region between Okinawa’s
main island and Miyako Island and could divide Japanese territory to the
west of Miyako. (1)
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Reacting to calls from academics, the public, and a government-commis-
sioned study group, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) unveiled a new
proactive security strategy termed the Dynamic Defence Force that raises
the profile of the MSDF and commits significant defensive and surveillance
assets to Japan’s southwestern islands in response to China’s expanding
maritime activities in waters surrounding Japan, including sailing patrol
vessels into Japan’s territorial waters. (2) However, the strategy’s implemen-
tation will be challenged by a stagnant defence budget and the effects of
the March 2011 earthquake, leaving persistent questions about whether
Japan can marshal the necessary resources to counter China’s increasingly
assertive posture in the East China Sea.
Official responses
While official Japanese documents refrain from labelling China as a
threat, the growing angst is unmistakable. The 2004 National Defence Pro-
gram Guidelines (NDPG) laid down a marker, noting that Tokyo would be
“attentive” to China’s future intentions. (3) In the 2010 Defence White
Paper, the terminology progressed to “concern” over the lack of trans-
parency in China’s military programs, defence budget, and overall security
policy. (4) A 2010 government-commissioned group that studied Japan’s fu-
ture defence capabilities cited advances in China’s naval, missile, and air
forces, and the development of asymmetric capabilities in space and cy-
berspace, and noted that the cross-Strait military balance with Taiwan was
shifting in China’s favour. (5) The 2011 Defence White Paper highlights how
the level of transparency in China’s military modernisation and decision-
making continue to fall short of the levels expected of a responsible major
power. (6) Using unusually harsh language, it describes China as “expanding
and intensifying” its maritime activities in waters strategically important
to Japan. The document cites numerous instances of military exercises,
monitoring activities, and “advancements to the Pacific Ocean” by Chinese
naval surface vessels. For example, in April 2010 and June 2011, large flotil-
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October 2008
Four vessels including a Sovremenny-class
destroyer sailed through the Tsugaru Strait
(the first identified passage by Chinese 
surface combat ships) before circling Japan
June 2009
Five vessels including a Luzhou-class destroyer sailed through
the waters off the northeast coast of Okinotori Island.
April 2010
Ten vessels including the Kilo-class
submarines and Sovremenny-class de-
stroyers sailed through the waters off
the west coast of Okinori Island.
November 2008
Four vessels including a Luzhou-class
destroyer sailed to the Pacific Ocean.
March 2010
Six vessels including a Luzhou-class
destroyer sailed to the Pacific Ocean.
July 2010
Two vessels including a Luzhou-class
destroyer sailed to the Pacific Ocean.
December 2008
Two Chinese maritime research ships
entered into the territorial waters of
Japan near the Senkaku Islands and
roved the area.
las of PLAN submarines and warships passed between Okinawa’s main is-
land and Miyako Island, conducting live-fire exercises en route in what a
Japanese Defence Ministry source called “a brazen show of force.” (7)
According to the White Paper, Chinese maritime activities are aimed at
intercepting naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from
Chinese territory; deterring and preventing Taiwan independence; acquir-
ing, maintaining, and protecting China’s maritime rights and interests; and
defending the sea lanes of communications. The White Paper forecasts
that China “plans to expand its sphere of maritime activities” in the waters
surrounding Japan and calls for greater attention to Chinese naval and sur-
veillance operations. (8)
One fear in Tokyo is that China could begin to dispatch armed “fisheries
patrol ships” to the East China Sea, as it has done in the South China Sea,
in an effort to exercise sea control under the guise of protecting fishing
boats. (9) The PLAN has also increased its information-gathering activities,
including oceanographic research within Japan’s Exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). In June 2011, a Chinese ocean research vessel was detected in
Japan’s EEZ investigating seawater contamination caused by the accident
at the Fukushima no. 1 power plant. (10) According to Japanese media, the
penetration of PLAN submarines between the Miyako and Yonaguni islands
indicates that the PLAN has acquired an understanding of ocean floor to-
pography, and has improved the quieting of its submarines, which consti-
tute significant operational and technical developments. (11) In addition, Air
Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) jets were scrambled to ward off Chinese planes
96 times in fiscal year (FY) 2010, double the number in FY2009. While no
aircraft actually violated Japanese airspace, in March 2011 two Chinese Y-
8 surveillance planes crossed the median line between Japan and China
and came close to Japanese airspace over the Senkaku Islands for the first
time. (12)
When physical confrontations between Japanese and Chinese vessels
have occurred, Chinese explanations of the incidents have failed to satisfy
Japanese officials. For example, after PLAN helicopters buzzed MSDF ves-
sels in April 2010, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya rejected China’s con-
tention that the helicopters were performing necessary defensive acts and
insisted that the MSDF was performing surveillance in accordance with in-
ternational law. (13) In the most serious incident from a diplomatic perspec-
tive, in September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler deliberately rammed
two Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels off the Senkakus. Tokyo’s decision to
detain the captain provoked a harsh response from Beijing, including diplo-
matic protests, cancellation of high-level official meetings and cultural ex-
changes, restrictions on rare earth mineral exports to Japan, and demands
for compensation, all of which led to a deterioration in bilateral relations.
The 2011 China Security Report by Japan’s National Institute for Defence
Studies (NIDS) notes that the PLA’s operations are sometimes incompatible
with principles and practices shared by the international community, such as
freedom of navigation. And while the PLA has embraced military diplomacy
with other nations to reduce suspicion about its modernisation, military ex-
changes with Japan have been limited as China continues to condition such
exchanges on progress in the overall political relationship between the two
nations. The NIDS report advocates steps to prevent accidents and defuse
crises should they occur. Although a Joint Working Group between the de-
fence authorities of the two nations has met twice since 2008, a bilateral cri-
sis communications mechanism has yet to be established. (14)
In December 2010, Japan released the NDPG for 2011, detailing a new
security strategy that is largely a reaction to China’s increasing naval ac-
tivities in waters surrounding Japan. Deputy Defence Minister Jun Azumi
stated “We must put priority on strengthening our defence capability in
the south and the west, looking toward China.” (15) Japan will no longer rely
on the “Basic Defence Force Concept,” which was introduced in 1976 and
relied on a minimum capability to defend Japan against the threat posed
by the Soviet Union; instead, Japan will develop a “Dynamic Defence
Force” that possesses readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and ver-
satility, reinforced by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities. (16)
The NDPG redirects the traditional focus away from the GSDF and the
threat of a full-scale land invasion of the Japanese home islands to defence
of Japan’s maritime domain, particularly in the southwest, including the re-
mote Nansei Islands. It calls for a redirection of manpower and defensive
platforms, including placing assets on previously unoccupied islands.
The NDPG represents a major step for the DPJ, which was seen as weak
on defence due to its failure to forcefully stand up to China in the wake of
maritime incidents. Upon assuming office in 2009, Prime Minister Ha-
toyama emphasised establishing an equidistant posture between Wash-
ington and Beijing. His mishandling of foreign policy, in particular a do-
mestic funding scandal and the issue of the relocation of the US Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa, resulted in his replacement by
Naoto Kan in 2010. The DPJ was also criticised for the delayed release of
the 2010 White Paper and the NDPG, which some argued hindered Japan’s
ability to undertake defensive countermeasures against China. (17)
While the release of the NDPG has silenced some DPJ critics, the FY2011
draft defence budget revealed a 0.4 percent drop in funding to 4.66 trillion
yen (USD 56.8 billion), the ninth consecutive year of reductions. (18) Thus,
Japan will have less funding with which to implement the new defence
strategy. Cooperation with other countries, or what the NDPG terms “mul-
tilayered security,” is therefore a cornerstone of the strategy. Following a
rough stretch in 2009 and 2010, the Japan-US alliance appears solid. In the
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wake of the Senkaku incident and North Korea’s provocative actions,
the government of Japan has concluded that the US military presence
positively contributes to its security environment and is eager to
strengthen the alliance. At the 2010 APEC summit, Prime Minister Kan
publicly recognised the importance of the US presence in Asia, and in
December of that year, Japan and the US carried out major military ex-
ercises. In June 2011, Japanese and US foreign and defence ministers
convened the Security Consultative Committee, where both sides
agreed to postpone the contentious relocation of the US Marine Corps
Air Station Futenma until after 2014 and reached agreement on new
“common strategic objectives,” including joint goals in their relations
with China. The participants discussed “non-traditional security con-
cerns” in outer space, the high seas, and cyberspace, and reaffirmed the
importance of freedom of navigation throughout regional waters, all
veiled allusions to concerns prompted by Chinese actions in recent
years. The joint statement called for China’s “adherence to international
norms of behaviour” and urged the improved openness and trans-
parency of its growing military. The statement also highlighted the im-
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portance of cooperation between Japan, the US, and other regional
countries such as Australia and South Korea. (19)
The NDPG also prioritises cooperation with South Korea and Australia in
bilateral as well as multilateral initiatives with the US, ASEAN, and India. (20)
In 2007, Japan and Australia signed an unprecedented security declaration
promoting cooperation on border security, counterterrorism, disaster relief,
and strategic assessments. The following year, both sides agreed to expand
military exercises and hold regular security consultations. In 2010, an Ac-
quisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was formalised, allowing
the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) and the Australian military to mutu-
ally provide transportation, accommodation, maintenance, and health
services, and marking Japan’s first such agreement with a country besides
the US. (21) The first-ever joint naval exercise by the US, Japan, and Australia
was held in the South China Sea in July 2011. One month after North
Korea attacked South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island (November 2010) and
five months after China warned the US not to carry out carrier-based ex-
ercises with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the West Sea (July 2010),
South Korea joined the US-Japan exercises as an observer for the first time
in December 2010, demonstrating solidarity among the three countries.
Against the background of North Korea’s military provocations and China’s
increased maritime activity, the US has encouraged further cooperation
between Japan and South Korea. In a January 2011 meeting, Japanese and
South Korean defence ministers pledged to enhance cooperation. (22)
Military reactions
In response to stepped-up Chinese naval activity in the East China Sea,
the JSDF must expand its range of operations without a concurrent in-
crease in resources; therefore Japan will dramatically rationalise and
streamline the JSDF. The defence budget has cut back procurement of arms
for the GSDF and made the MSDF the preeminent military branch under
the revised approach to defending Japan. Outdated equipment and organ-
isations will be reduced across services, the location and operational
modality of forces will be reassessed, and budget allocation will be subject
to “drastic review.” (23) In order to implement the NDPG’s findings, the Min-
istry of Defence (MOD) has established a committee to find ways to en-
hance operational capabilities through integration of the different services.
The committee raised issues such as mobile deployment, command and
control, and warning and surveillance capabilities. It also developed scenar-
ios involving the JSDF engaging in operations to take back the Senkakus
after an illegal landing by persons pretending to be fishermen or an inva-
sion by the Chinese military. (24)
In response to growing concerns about threats from China, increasing de-
fensive capability throughout the southwestern Nansei Island chain has
become a national priority. Ground, air, and naval forces will be increased
in the far southern islands. One hundred GSDF members will be deployed
for the first time on Yonaguni, (25) Japan’s westernmost island, and consid-
eration is being given to building a monitoring station on Yonaguni to track
the movements of Chinese vessels in the East China Sea using optical
equipment and radar. (26) Mobile units will assist in the event of attacks,
making the improvement of ASDF transport capabilities for deploying
units crucial. Joint rapid-response exercises will be increased in preparation
for such scenarios. Japan will deploy ground-based anti-ship missiles and
dispatch another F-15 squadron to Okinawa, effectively doubling the num-
ber of fighter aircraft deployed in the south. (27)
Intelligence and surveillance assets will also be increased, including un-
manned surveillance aircraft and coastal surveillance units with ground-
based radar. (28) In addition, MOD will purchase ten new Kawasaki P1 patrol
planes to monitor submarines and suspicious boats operating near Japan-
ese territorial waters. These planes will replace half of the P3C planes now
used for missions such as taking photos of the disputed Shirakaba/Chunx-
iao gas field in the East China Sea. (29) An agreement was reached with Bei-
jing in June 2008 to establish a joint development zone and finalise a
treaty, but bilateral friction has hampered implementation. In March 2011,
China reportedly began drilling off the gas field, prompting Japan to ex-
press regret. (30) The MOD intends to prioritise issues that must be dealt
with immediately and these needs will be reflected in budget requests for
the FY2012 draft budget. (31)
For the first time in 30 years, Japan’s fleet of diesel-electric submarines
is expanding, from 16 to 22. Although numerically inferior to China’s fleet
of roughly 60 submarines, Japanese submarines are world-class and will
conduct surveillance and defensive missions. Japan’s Aegis-equipped de-
stroyer fleet with ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability is also increas-
ing from four to six, and last year the MSDF and US Navy deployed a cer-
tified sea-based theatre BMD capability. Four new Akizuki-class destroyers
will be procured to protect the Aegis destroyers. Japan is also planning to
field new “helicopter destroyers” that are ideal for anti-submarine war-
fare. (32)
The Japan Coast Guard has recently emerged as a fourth military branch
with considerable surveillance responsibility. Unlike other JSDF branches,
the JCG has a positive image free from association with Japan’s militaristic
history. According to Richard J. Samuels, the modernisation and expansion
of the JCG enhances Japan’s power projection capabilities and allows it to
project influence without the destabilising consequences of a major de-
fence budget increase. As the JCG’s patrolling authority has grown, pres-
sure has built to enhance the JCG’s combat capabilities by adding capabil-
ities such as a modern weapons suite, armaments, and sensors. (33)
Although the MSDF holds a qualitative advantage over China in many
areas, concerns persist that it lacks the quantitative resources needed in its
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enhanced role. The MSDF lacks auxiliary ships, as new ships essentially re-
place those retired due to normal attrition. Additionally, while unmanned
aircraft have been prioritised, cost estimates for four Global Hawks for 24-
hour surveillance reach the tens of billions of yen (hundreds of millions of
euros), leading one senior official to argue that “Under current fiscal con-
ditions, we could not afford to purchase them.” (34) The US will shoulder
some of the burden. In December 2010, American and Japanese forces ex-
ercised defending remote islands in Keen Sword, which involved 34,000
JSDF personnel and 40 warships, along with 20 US vessels. (35) Other joint
initiatives will emphasise enhancing cyber and information security, reduc-
ing vulnerabilities to possible threats from China. The MSDF has also par-
ticipated in international missions in the Gulf of Aden and hopes such en-
deavours will increase readiness and operational capability. In sum, the
JSDF aims to spread its limited assets across a broad maritime domain in
a manner that allows it the flexibility to quickly detect and respond to
contingencies involving China.
Academic reactions
Japanese scholars have become increasingly concerned with China’s mil-
itary build-up. Sumihiko Kawamura of the conservative Okazaki Institute
believes Japan cannot ignore China’s aggressive behaviour. He argues, “The
majority of Japanese perceive that China is increasing assertiveness and
threatening Japan,” and Japan must therefore strengthen its military. (36)
From this perspective the NDPG’s new strategy is seen as a positive move.
Professor Takashi Kawakami maintains that the shift in strategy was nec-
essary. He emphasises the need to hedge and balance against China to pre-
vent it from exploiting a military vacuum, just as the former Soviet Union
did with the islands off Hokkaido. Regarding the new focus on the south-
western islands, Kawakami states, “There is a deterrent effect and I think it
sends a big message to China.” (37) Other Japanese scholars view China as
posing a long-term threat and urge that greater attention be paid to the
more immediate danger from North Korea. For example, Tokyo University’s
Yoshimitsu Nishikawa agrees that shifting defence policy to deal with the
challenges posed by China is necessary, but worries that a North Korean
contingency could negatively affect Japan’s security in the near term. (38)
Japanese scholars are also discussing the Japan-US alliance and its role
in deterring Chinese aggression. Yoshihide Soeya of Keio University
maintains that the alliance serves the country’s strategic needs and pre-
dicts that China’s assertiveness will drive Japan closer to the US. He ar-
gues, “Without the alliance, Japan cannot deal with the modernization
of China’s military and its increased activities.” (39) Yet other Japanese
scholars worry about US staying power over the long run and the via-
bility of the US deterrent. Yasuhiro Matsuda notes that China’s develop-
ment of area-denial capabilities and space-war technology could inhibit
the US Navy’s freedom of navigation and damage US satellite net-
works. (40) One suggestion to bolster the alliance is the AirSea Battle
Concept contained in the US Quadrennial Defence Review, which is
likely intended as a hedge against China. It entails greater integration of
JSDF and US intelligence and warning systems, and could require
greater Japanese contributions to BMD development and the expansion
of anti-submarine barriers throughout the southwest Pacific. Some
Japanese are sceptical as to whether the concept will be opera-
tionalised, however, and argue that given Japan’s budget woes, the
NDPG may represent a sounder strategy. (41)
Public opinion
Japanese public opinion polls reveal growing public distrust of China. In a
November 2009 poll, 69 percent of respondents found China either “not
very trustworthy” or “not trustworthy.” (42) In another 2009 survey, over 54
percent of respondents considered Japan-China relations to be “not so
good” or “not good.” (43) Feelings quickly hardened after the September
2010 Senkaku incident, with a record 84 percent of respondents finding
China untrustworthy. Ninety-four percent said Chinese demands for an
apology and compensation were unacceptable, (44) and 79 percent felt a
military threat from China. (45) Newspaper editorials excoriated China’s de-
cisions to curtail dialogue on joint energy exploration in the East China Sea
and restrict exports of rare earths, and suggested that Chinese foreign pol-
icy was increasingly at the mercy of hardliners. The Senkaku incident was
voted the news story of the year in a poll of junior high school students. (46)
In a more recent survey, a March 2011 BBC World Service poll revealed
that 88 percent of Japanese had a negative reaction to China becoming
more powerful militarily. (47)
The Japanese public’s concern goes beyond China’s conventional
weapons development to include modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. For
example, a January editorial expressed concern over the sincerity of
China’s “no first use” policy for nuclear weapons. (48) A public opinion sur-
vey revealed that 80 percent of respondents are apprehensive about the
nuclear arms situation in Northeast Asia and want discussion on the nu-
clear issue within both the government and the Diet. (49) This does not nec-
essarily suggest that there is growing support for the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by Japan; rather it indicates that a growing number of Japanese
demand an informed debate about Japan’s security environment and its
strategic defence options.
Reflecting public angst, an Asahi Shimbun editorial lamented the Chi-
nese public’s failure to criticise rising defence spending. It concluded that
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favourable public sentiment toward the military would keep China’s de-
fence budget growing for the foreseeable future. (50) Highlighting the
close military ties of Xi Jinping, who is expected to become the next Chi-
nese Communist Party General-Secretary, a Sankei Shimbun editorial
suggested that Xi’s rise to power could be accompanied by an increase
in PLA influence on the Party. (51) A Yomiuri Shimbun editorial noted the
controversy over China’s alleged labelling of the South China Sea as a
“core interest” and predicted that Beijing would expand the term to in-
clude the East China Sea. (52) Given such sentiment, the Japanese public
will likely maintain pressure on the government to remain firm towards
China.
Post-earthquake effects
The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami prompted an immediate
pledge of support for Japan from Chinese President Hu Jintao, but the pos-
itive impact on bilateral relations was limited, as news surfaced shortly
thereafter that China’s patrols in the East China Sea continued unabated.
For example, on 7 and 26 March, a Chinese helicopter buzzed a MSDF ship
in international waters in the East China Sea. (53) With debt approaching
200 percent of GDP and post-earthquake reconstruction costing hundreds
of billions of US dollars, Tokyo will likely have to rethink its national secu-
rity priorities. Officials have tried to downplay the effect on defence, yet
there are concerns that the crisis will affect JSDF funding as government
revenue and spending is reduced. The JSDF may face pressure to fund en-
hanced disaster response capability at the expense of improving combat
capability, and funds could even be reallocated from the integrated air and
missile defence program to operational budgets. Japan may also reduce its
involvement in international peacekeeping efforts. Tokyo’s plan to pur-
chase 50 FX fighters to upgrade its aging fleet appears to remain on track,
however, suggesting that Japanese officials remain committed to long-
term strategic priorities set prior to the March disaster. (54) Rising anxiety
about China is likely to result in a gradual but unmistakable shift of em-
phasis from the defence of the Japanese home islands to defence of
Japan’s maritime domain, and to greater cooperation with Australia and
South Korea.
Australia
Unlike Japan, Australia has not had any direct military confrontations
with the PLA that would justify immediate investments in military capa-
bilities to counter the threat; however, like Japan, a growing number in
Australia see China as the most likely direct threat in the coming decades.
As a result of China’s rise and the potential it has to destabilise the re-
gional security status quo, Canberra has adopted a hedging strategy – in-
creasing cooperation and defence links with Beijing while also strength-
ening its ties with the US and other nations and preparing to invest in the
capabilities to confront a major power by sea and air. Public opinion
would seem to back this strategy, as a growing number of Australians ex-
press concern over China’s military modernisation. However, given Aus-
tralia’s distance from China, its close economic relationship, and budget-
ary issues, some Australian academics do not approve, believing that the
“China threat” is an over-hyped excuse for military investment and that
other types of military operations are more likely but ignored in the new
policy.
Official responses
Over the past decade, Australia’s defence policy has gradually adjusted
to China’s military modernisation. In the first half of the decade, Canberra’s
focus was largely on terrorism and small-scale operations, with an empha-
sis on the need to develop flexible and mobile capabilities to combat non-
traditional threats or to perform peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance,
or disaster relief missions. However, starting in 2005, though non-tradi-
tional missions remained the focal point, the Defence Department began
to show more concern for the shifting strategic environment in the Asia-
Pacific caused by conventional military build-ups, saying that the Aus-
tralian Defence Force (ADF) should be prepared for “a wide range of even-
tualities.” The 2007 “Defence Update” showed an even greater awareness
of the growth of the PLA and its effects on regional security, saying, “The
ADF increasingly will be called on to fight irregular opponents… but we
must also remain alert to more conventional military dangers.” (55)
It was not until 2009, however, that Canberra realised that the shift in re-
gional security dynamics required a fundamental re-evaluation of its de-
fence policy. Australia’s “Defence White Paper 2009” demonstrates that
apprehension over traditional military threats has returned to the fore-
front. The paper highlights Canberra’s dual concerns: the rise of China and
the relative decline of the United States. It notes that China’s military
modernisation program will be characterised by the development of power
projection capabilities and predicts China by 2030 will be “the strongest
Asian military power, by a considerable margin.” The paper also warns that
while a major power of China’s stature can be expected to develop a glob-
ally significant military capability befitting its size, a development that
may ultimately lead to a stable multi-polar region, “The pace, scope and
structure of China’s military modernisation have the potential to give its
neighbours cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does
not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans.” At
the same time, Australia’s Defence Department predicts that by 2030, the
US – the ally in whose hands Canberra has largely placed its security – may
find itself “preoccupied and stretched in some parts of the world such that
its ability to shift attention and project power into other regions, when it
needs to, is constrained.” Furthermore, the white paper concludes that due
to uncertain economic futures, certain Asia-Pacific powers such as the US
may face declining military budgets. China is expected to be able to main-
tain the ability to afford its military programs, however. (56)
Although the 2009 Defence White Paper makes developing a friendly de-
fence relationship with China a priority, it also reflects a hedging strategy.
On the one hand, Canberra hopes the US will still provide strategic reas-
surance two decades hence, and it does not rule out that Beijing will rise
peacefully; at the same time, however, the paper says that Australia must
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be prepared for the worst-case – and possibly more likely – scenario where
China presents a threat and the US cannot effectively defend Australia. The
hedging strategy calls for strengthening the alliance with the US and pri-
oritising improved defence relations with China; at the same time, it calls
for investing in the capabilities to enhance deterrence and defend Australia
against the most likely aggressor (i.e., China), if necessary. (57)
Specifically, though it states that war between major powers is nearly
unthinkable, the white paper concludes, “After careful examination, it is the
Government’s view that it would be premature to judge that war among
states, including the major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the
international system.” Significantly, despite the fact that this scenario is
“nearly unthinkable,” the Defence Department chose to prepare for it, call-
ing for investments of AUS$100 billion over the next two decades in mar-
itime capabilities, special forces, aerial refuelling, airborne early warning
and control, strategic strike, and force projection capabilities. (58) As The
Australian wrote at the time, “The rise of China will shape Australia’s de-
fence planning for a generation.” (59)
The 2009 Defence White Paper was followed by a June 2011 announce-
ment that the Defence Department would be conducting a major “force
posture review” for the first time in two decades. Though the growth of the
PLA was not specifically mentioned as an impetus, Defence Minister
Stephen Smith did indicate that “the growth of military power projection
capabilities of countries in the Asia Pacific” was a major concern. An ex-
pected result of the review is for a shift in focus for ADF forces to countries
north and west to better protect Australia from Asian militaries, specifi-
cally China’s. (60)
Additionally, Australia’s leadership and defence apparatuses have hedged
their bets on China’s peaceful rise by boosting ties with allies and partners.
Perhaps Canberra’s most important move came in November 2010, when
at the Australia-US defence and foreign ministers talks, the two sides an-
nounced an agreement that would allow for a “major escalation” in US
military presence in the South Pacific, allowing for increased US access to
Australian training exercise and test ranges, the prepositioning of US
equipment in Australia, and greater use by the US military of Australian fa-
cilities and ports. (61) In November 2011, President Obama and Prime Min-
ister Gillard announced an agreement to deploy 2,500 US Marines to Aus-
tralia permanently; Obama said that the US presence would not only in-
crease military collaboration between the two countries but was also de-
signed “to meet the demands of a lot of partners in the region that want
to feel that…we have the presence that’s necessary to maintain the secu-
rity architecture in the region.” (62) US access to Australia can be seen as a
direct response to Australian concerns that PLA anti-access and area denial
capabilities threaten the US ability to promptly respond to military crises
in the region.
Aside from the US, Canberra has stepped up defence cooperation with
India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Singapore. After joint military
exercises and calls for greater military cooperation in late 2008, Aus-
tralia and India entered into a “strategic partnership” and signed a “Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation” when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
travelled to New Delhi in November 2009. (63) After reaffirming the Aus-
tralia-Japan strategic partnership and boosting security cooperation in
2007, PM Gillard in April 2011 visited Tokyo, where she called for boost-
ing defence cooperation between the two US allies even further; that
meeting specifically involved consultations on the implications of
China’s rise. On the same trip, PM Gillard also looked to expand defence
cooperation with South Korea. (64) All of these actions can be seen as
creating a concert of democracies in the Asia-Pacific, united not only by
their common values but also by their concerns about China’s military
modernisation.
Academic responses
Within the Australian academic community, there exists a lively debate
over how Australia should respond to China, and in particular whether Can-
berra should join the “arms race” in the Asia-Pacific. This back-and-forth
was particularly loud after the release of the 2009 white paper. Many Aus-
24 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 1 / 4
57. Cameron Stewart and Patrick Walters, “Spy Chiefs Cross Swords over China as Kevin Rudd Backs De-
fence Hawks,” The Australian, 11 April 2009.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Brendan Nicholson and Mark Dodd, “Defence Review to Boost US Role in Region,” The Australian, 23
June 2011, www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence-review-to-boost-us-role-in-
region/story-fn59niix-1226080212802 (consulted on 30 November 2011).
61. See Rory Medcalf, “The Debate Down Under, in Context,” CSIS Asia Policy Blog, 14 February 2011,
http://cogitasia.com/babbage-report-kokoda-strategic-edge-in-2030-rory-medcalf-lowy (consulted
on 30 November 2011); Brendan Nicholson. “US Forces Get Nod to Share Our Bases,” The Australian,
6 November 2010; or Stephen Smith, Minister of Defence, Australia, “Asia’s New Distribution of Power
and its Implications,” the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit (The Shangri-La Dialogue), 4 June 2011,
www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/third-plenary-
session/stephen-smith (consulted on 30 November 2011).
62. “Seeking to Contain China, US to Establish Permanent Military Presence Down Under,” ABC News, 16
November 2011.
63. See Manmohan Singh and Kevin Rudd, “Joint Statement,” 12 November 2009, www.hcindia-
au.org/pdf/joint_statement.pdf (consulted on 30 November 2011); and also “Visit of Australian For-
eign Minister Stephen Smith to New Delhi from 8-12 September 2008,” Australian Department of For-
eign Affairs and Trade, 8 September 2008, www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2008/fa-s142_08.html
(consulted on 13 December 2011).
64. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” 13 March
2007, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html (consulted on 30 November 2011);
and also John Garnaut, “Gillard’s defensive talk adds to China tensions,” Sidney Morning Herald, 22
April 2011.
Special feature
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left, speaks as U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, left,
Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Kevin Rudd, second from
right, and Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith look on
during a press conference after the annual Australia-United
States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) at Government
House in Melbourne, Australia, on 8 November 2010.
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tralian academics supported the strategic shift, calling it “prudent” and
“sound;” (65) however, two primary arguments arose against the white
paper: the first challenged the premise that China was a threat that re-
quired a military response and the second argued against the force struc-
ture proposed in the paper.
In line with the first argument, Alan Dupont, director of the Centre for In-
ternational Security Studies at the University of Sydney, maintained that
it makes “no sense to allow worst-case assessments of China’s intentions
and capabilities to determine the next 20 years of Australian defence
spending and strategy.” Dupont contends that China shows no intent to
dominate the region militarily, and even if it did, its capabilities do not
match those of the US or even Japan. He concluded, “The notion that we
should justify much of our future defence spending on the dubious as-
sumption that the ADF needs to be able to deter or balance Chinese mili-
tary power is neither a sensible basis for a defence strategy nor a reason
for acquiring expensive capabilities that we do not need and cannot af-
ford.” (66) Rory Medcalf, director of the international security program at
the Lowy Institute, argued that Australia should enhance cooperation with
China, not compete militarily; further, he wrote, the white paper had the
potential to spark an even greater arms race: “The problem is that many
Asian countries may read our white paper as a sign they are not afraid
enough: if the Australians, way down there, feel the need to revolutionise
their firepower, they could think maybe we should redouble ours.” (67) Rod
Lyon of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute maintained that Australia
cannot tell what China’s intentions or capabilities will ultimately be in
2030 and therefore should not make the strategic decision to invest heav-
ily to counter those capabilities in 2009. If China ultimately is belligerent,
Lyon says, Canberra will have plenty of time to develop its capabilities be-
fore 2030; if China’s military modernisation ultimately poses no threat,
there is no need to waste the money. (68)
Among those who disagreed with the force structure changes proposed
in the white paper, Hugh White of the Australian National University, writ-
ing in The Australian, asserted that the military build-up would be nearly
impossible to fund, would likely be of little use even in a confrontation
with China, and would leave Australia’s ground force “too small to fill the
tasks expected of it in places such as East Timor and Papua New
Guinea.” (69) Similarly, Alan Dupont told The Australian that the most likely
future role for the ADF was on small-scale land operations, such as peace-
keeping, not great power maritime and air operations. (70) Writing from his
perch as a US Army Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution,
Colonel John Angevine maintained, “The plan…is focused on expensive
maritime and air capabilities for conflicts the ADF couldn’t fight alone.
Consequently, the ADF is exposed with an atrophying ground force and ex-
peditionary capability for the low-level regional operations in which it will
be most likely to engage.” (71)
While the vast majority of academics were divided between those who
supported the White Paper’s portrayal of China and those who judged that
it went too far, one influential Australian military analyst did not think the
document went far enough. Writing in February 2011, Ross Babbage of the
Kokoda Foundation argued, “By 2030, the PLA’s capabilities will probably
pose an even more direct challenge to Australian sovereignty.” To meet the
challenge, he called on Canberra to completely revamp its defence organ-
isation to create a force that could “deliver high asymmetric leverage
against a coercive major power in close partnership with the United
States.” Proposed areas of investment include advanced space warfare ca-
pabilities designed “to interfere with Chinese space systems”; advanced
underwater combat capabilities, such as nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines; next-generation large strategic strike aircraft; prompt conven-
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China and the United States are likely to come into conflict in
future and Australia will end up being drawn into the conflict
through its alliance with the United States
Here are some reasons other people have given as to why China might become a military threat to Australia. For each one please
tell me wether you agree or disagree it is a reason why you personally think China will become a military threat to 
Australia in the next 20 years?*
China views Australia as a country it could invade in 
future to secure land and resources
China's recent actions have been assertive and suggest it is
going to be a military aggressive power
China has been expanding and modernising its military, 
suggesting it is preparing for conflict
*Asked only of those saying "very likely" or "somewhat likely" "that China will become a military threat to australia in the next 20 years".
Table 1 – Australian Views of the Chinese Military
Source: Fergus Hanson, “Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Lowy Institute Poll 2010, 2010, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1305 (consulted on 30 November 2011).
tional strike capabilities to include long-range ballistic missiles; and “very
advanced” cyber warfare capabilities. In addition, Babbage proposed allow-
ing the US military greater access to Australian bases, and even basing
American forces on Australian soil. (72)
Public opinion
Similar to both Japan and South Korea, Australia’s public is increasingly
concerned about China’s military modernisation and its potential to desta-
bilise regional security. A BBC World Service poll published in March 2011
showed that only 20 percent of Australians had a positive reaction to
China becoming more powerful militarily, with 76 percent responding neg-
atively (equal to the ROK but lower than the 88 percent who reported the
same opinion in Japan). (73) A 2010 Lowy Institute poll found that although
73 percent of Australians believed China’s growth was good for their coun-
try, 69 percent nonetheless viewed China as trying to “dominate Asia” – a
rise of nine points from the 2008 iteration of the same poll. Additionally,
that survey found that 46 percent of Australians expect China will become
a military threat in the next 20 years, an increase of six points from the
previous year, even though a majority (52 percent) still anticipates China
will not pose a military threat. (74) As Andrew Shearer of the Lowy Institute
argues, a shift in Australian thinking about China occurred in 2009, after
China overtook Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner. He writes, “For
the first time, our major economic partner is a developing country with an
authoritarian political system. It is pursuing increasingly assertive mercan-
tilist policies, is rapidly modernising its military…and is emerging as a
strategic competitor to the United States in Asia. As a result it is becoming
increasingly difficult to align our strategic policies with our economic in-
terests.” (75) Overall, Australian public opinion largely tracks with the larger
trend throughout the country; the nation is reacting to China’s military rise
and beginning to contemplate the level of threat posed and the response
required by Canberra.
South Korea
The primary security concern in the Republic of Korea is, and will
likely continue to be for many years to come, North Korea. Most of
South Korea’s military resources and planning are focused northward,
and the changes in South Korean defence policy over the past decade
have been driven primarily by the evolving security threat posed by Py-
ongyang. At the same time, China’s military modernisation has fre-
quently registered on Seoul’s radar, though far less so than in Tokyo or
Canberra. This is particularly true at times, such as 2010, when Beijing’s
support for its ally in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
is most obvious; at these moments, the growth of the PLA raises ques-
tions about China’s intentions, particularly in a peninsular crisis, and in-
creases concerns that China’s military modernisation poses a threat to
South Korean security.
In 2010, two major North Korean provocations had spill-over effects on
South Korea’s relationship with China, and the subsequent downturn in
public opinion provoked calls for a greater ROK response to Beijing’s mili-
tary growth. In March 2010, the Cheon’an, a ROK naval vessel sailing near
disputed waters, was struck by a torpedo, resulting in the deaths of 46
South Korean sailors. As most of the world condemned the DPRK, Beijing
took weeks to convey its condolences to the ROK and promptly thereafter
welcomed Kim Jong Il to visit China; in the months that followed, China re-
fused to assign blame, only calling the event “unfortunate” while insisting
on the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. (76)
Eight months after the sinking of the Cheon’an and only days after the
DPRK revealed a previously unknown nuclear enrichment effort, North
Korea fired more than 170 rounds of artillery on the ROK island of Yeon-
pyeong, killing two military personnel and two civilians and injuring 19.
The ROK returned fire, causing damage to the North’s deployments, and
scrambled F-15 jets, though the aircraft did not engage. Pyongyang said
the attack was in retaliation for South Korean artillery exercises that morn-
ing. In the aftermath of the bombardment, China’s Foreign Ministry ex-
pressed “concern” but did not assign blame. (77)
Official responses
South Korea’s defence policy has followed a curious trajectory over the
last decade. In the early part of the decade, from a defence standpoint,
North Korea remained the “main enemy,” both literally in defence docu-
ments and in terms of defence planning. In 2004, after the improvement
in North-South relations, Seoul looked beyond the DPRK, launching a
major military modernisation effort in response to the growth of the mil-
itaries of China, Japan, Russia, and the US. In the 2006 Defence White
Paper, the Defence Ministry wrote, “Most countries in the region are pur-
suing military transformation and technical innovation in order to mod-
ernise and enhance their military capabilities under the new security envi-
ronment.” (78) However, by the end of the decade and after countless
provocative outbursts, North Korea had regained its status as the “main
enemy,” and military modernisation in countries such as China had largely
lost the attention of Seoul. (79)
The ROK’s most significant defence reform effort came in 2005 with the
“Defence Reform 2020” plan. As originally proposed, the plan was not
necessarily focused on North Korea but can instead be viewed as a re-
sponse to regional military modernisation – in China but also in Japan and
Russia – as well as an attempt to placate South Korea’s security hawks
during the years of the “Sunshine Policy.” The 2020 plan had five goals: it
called for quantitative reductions to forces coupled with qualitative im-
provements to weaponry; it increased civilian authority in the Defence
Ministry; it augmented the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it secured long-
term military spending; and it sought to create a more equal alliance re-
lationship with the US through an emphasis on greater capacity for au-
tonomy and self-reliance. Importantly, the plan focused on personnel re-
ductions while at the same time replacing outdated systems with ad-
vanced technologies, including advanced fighter jets, modern radar sys-
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tems, Aegis-equipped naval forces, missile technologies, and sub-
marines. (80) As the ROK Minister of Defence explained, the plan would
create a South Korean military that “sees farther, moves faster, and strikes
more precisely” in an era of military modernisation. (81) Possibly as a result
of this effort, it was revealed in August 2011 that the ROK was developing
a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, with one military source explaining
that the missile was intended “to cope with the threat from the navies of
neighbouring big powers rather than the threat from North Korea.” (82)
However, Pyongyang’s provocations – including nuclear tests, missile fir-
ings, and the attacks of 2010 – along with the election of President Lee
Myung Bak and the financial crisis of 2008-2009, altered South Korea’s
modernisation plan. In 2009, the original proposed spending for the De-
fence Reform 2020 plan was reduced by 30 percent as a result of evolving
priorities and financial uncertainties. (83) That same year, the Blue House
proposed shifting the modernisation plan away from expensive naval and
air forces and back toward ground forces and technologies designed to
thwart a North Korean missile strike. (84) And in 2011, after the Cheon’an
and Yeonpyeong incidents, South Korea announced its “Defence Reform
307” policy, intended to address some of the shortfalls within the South
Korean military and command structure witnessed during the North Ko-
rean provocations of last year. Calling for a “paradigm shift” for the ROK
military, Defence Minister Kim Kwan Jin said the 307 reform plan would
shift the country from “passive defence to active deterrence” by investing
in advanced technologies needed to combat North Korea, such as stealth
fighters, missile defence, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
technologies, and precision munitions. (85)
South Korea’s other method of preparing for the evolving regional secu-
rity dynamics as a result of China’s military modernisation has been to re-
vitalise and rebalance its alliance relationship with the US. Though this is
mostly geared toward North Korea, the improvement of the alliance has
also helped to ensure a long-term US presence even beyond a divided
peninsula. It is important to note that many of the major agreements be-
tween the allies occurred in the middle of the last decade, at the time
when South Korea was focused beyond North Korea on creating a more
self-reliant defence force to compete with other regional powers, including
China. The two sides negotiated a reconfiguration in the US force posture
in South Korea, reducing the number of troops, relocating and handing
over bases, building more permanent facilities, and preparing for the trans-
fer of wartime operational control from the US to South Korea (though
this has since been delayed in the wake of North Korean provocations). (86)
One issue that has caused friction between the allies is the “strategic
flexibility” of US forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula, with Seoul
being concerned, in part, about China’s negative reaction should the US
use forces stationed in Korea for missions “off-peninsula.” The crux of
South Korea’s hesitance is that Beijing would interpret strategic flexibility
as targeting China – specifically that the ROK was granting US Forces in
Korea the right to intervene in a Taiwan Strait crisis. Despite these con-
cerns, in April 2011, US forces stationed in Korea deployed for the first time
off the peninsula to partake in a training exercise in the Philippines, and it
is likely that the movement toward strategic flexibility will proceed in the
future. (87)
Academic and editorial responses
As with the government and Defence Ministry, South Korea’s academic
and editorial communities have expressed apprehension about China’s
military modernisation only episodically. Their concerns can be organised
into three different categories. The first concern is over the strengthening
of the PLA in the context of a larger regional arms race. A frequent worry
has been that South Korea is being “sandwiched” between growing Chi-
nese and Japanese militaries. (88) Speaking in 2007, Jun Kyung Man, vice di-
rector of the state-run Korea Institute for Defence Analyses, expressed his
concern that the regional arms race between Beijing and Tokyo threatened
the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula because the two militaries
were likely to stoke insecurity in Pyongyang. Jun called for the continua-
tion of the modernisation proposed in the Defence Reform 2020, noting
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The aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) and
the Republic of Korea navy Aegis destroyer Sejong the Great
(DDG KDX 991) transit in the Yellow Sea during a bilateral
exercise on 13 October 2009. George Washington, the
Navy’s only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, 
is underway supporting security and stability in the region.
(US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd
Class Jeffrey Stewart). 
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/us-pacific-command/4018136706
(consulted on 30 November 2011).
that even the significant military investment by the ROK was minor com-
pared to that of China and Japan. (89) Similarly, after the test flight of the
PLA’s stealth J-20 fighter in early 2011, Park Byung Kwang, a researcher at
the Institute for National Security Strategy, wrote that Japan was already
working to acquire a stealth jet and that the ROK “must also come up with
a security strategy and an action plan against China’s growing military as-
pirations.” (90) And after the release of the 307 reform, a Korea Times edito-
rial criticised the plan for its single-minded focus on North Korea, asking
“Should [not] the nation be also paying far greater attention to the two
military giants in this part of the world – militarily resurgent Japan and
China, who can already jump from regional to global military power?” (91)
The second concern in ROK commentary circles is the role of a confident
and modernised PLA in a North Korean instability scenario. Writing in
March 2010, Pak Ch’ang-hu’i of the Korea National Defence University ar-
gued that Chinese military intervention in a DPRK contingency scenario is
“inevitable” due to Beijing’s strong interest in influencing the outcome of
the situation; the only question for Pak is, how will the PLA intervene: uni-
laterally against South Korea and the US, or multilaterally in cooperation
with other regional powers? Either way, Pak concludes, Chinese interven-
tion hurts the chances of the ROK-led unification effort and may even
stand in the way of a unified peninsula altogether. To prevent this, he calls
on Seoul to craft a “grand strategy for unification” that considers the pace
and method by which Beijing’s influence can be reduced. (92) Similarly, a
Korea Herald editorial in response to rumoured ROK-US contingency plan-
ning discussions in November 2009 called on the allies to closely consider
the role of the PLA in any situation: “No contingency plans…will have
much significance without considering how China will respond when a
chaotic situation prevails in North Korea.” The editorial said the focus of
any contingency plan should be on “how the allies can prevent China’s mil-
itary intervention in the event of a North Korean collapse.” (93)
A final concern in ROK academic circles is that China’s military might in-
creasingly threaten the presence of the US in the region and this, in turn,
raises questions as to whether South Korea should rely so heavily on its
ally. Writing in February 2011, Chang Soo-man, commissioner of the ROK
Defence Acquisition Program Administration, called on Seoul to increase
investments in missile defence, saying that China’s development of a “car-
rier killing” missile could limit US ability to intervene on behalf of the ROK.
He writes, “China’s development of the ASBM [anti-ship ballistic missile]
could lead to significant changes in South Korea’s military readiness, given
that thus far the focus has been on preparations to counter North Korean
ballistic missiles.” (94) A Chosun Ilbo editorial from the same time warned,
“If China boosts its defence investments in proportion to its 8-9 percent
annual economic growth, the day is not far off when it approaches the US
in military power as well.” (95)
Public opinion
Since the normalisation of relations in 1992, public opinion toward China
in the ROK has largely grown more positive. While other nations worried
about PLA modernisation, the ROK embraced China’s rise, emphasising the
prospective economic benefits instead of the security threat. (96) However,
the effects of Beijing’s support for North Korea in the face of its provoca-
tive actions, coupled with a number of nationalistic episodes between
China and South Korea involving territorial and economic disputes, have
reversed that trend. According to a BBC public opinion poll published in
March 2011, negative views regarding China’s military modernisation in
the ROK rose from 58 percent in 2005 to 76 percent in early 2011. (97) In
terms of opinions toward China writ large, a Hanguk Ilbo poll from late
2010 showed that 48.6 percent of South Koreans reported that the events
of 2010 had negatively impacted their views of China. (98) And, a poll by the
Asan Institute for Policy Studies showed an extraordinary 91 percent of
South Koreans dissatisfied with China’s response in the wake of the Yeon-
pyeong attack. (99) Though this is more a commentary on Beijing’s foreign
policy than its military modernisation, it is possible that this decidedly
negative shift in public opinion will spur louder calls for a firmer response
in Seoul to the growth of the PLA. It remains to be seen how sustainable
the ROK concern over the China threat will be, whether it is from the pub-
lic, academics, or political leaders; recent history has shown that South
Korea’s current concern over China may only be temporary, and all eyes
may soon return to the threat from the North.
Conclusion
Chinese military modernisation has raised varying degrees of concern in
Japan, Australia, and South Korea. While there is a general hope that the re-
gion can accommodate China’s rise peacefully, the PLA’s evolving capabil-
ity to project power beyond its shores, incidents in the bodies of water that
connect these countries to China, and on-going friction and competition
between the US and China have convinced Tokyo, Canberra, and Seoul that
some measure of hedging is appropriate. Each is in different stages of this
effort, and debate continues in all three capitals over how to craft an ap-
propriate response to China’s growing military power. Central to each
country’s strategy is the US, particularly in Japan and South Korea, where
it is hoped the alliance can off-set limited domestic resources allocated for
military expenditures. Yet questions about the long-term viability of the
US regional presence continue to fester, and doubts persist about the abil-
ity of the US to deter Chinese coercive diplomacy and aggression given ex-
panding Chinese area-denial capabilities and the likelihood of shrinking US
defence spending.
Anxiety about China’s military is greatest in Japan due to recent mar-
itime encounters and lingering territorial disputes. Japan is shedding its tra-
ditional defensive strategy and taking a more active approach that utilises
advanced technological platforms to detect and quickly respond to Chi-
nese provocations across a vast maritime domain. Despite its qualitative
28 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 1 / 4
89. Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korea in Nutcracker of Regional Arms Race,” Korea Times, 20 May 2007.
90. Park Byung-kwang, “China’s Stealthy Wake-up Call,” JoongAng Ilbo, 18 January 2011.
91. “Rebirth of Military,” Korea Times, 9 March 2011.
92. Pak Ch’ang-hu’i, “A North Korea Contingency and China’s Military Intervention Prospects,” Kukka
Cho’llyak (National Strategy), vol. 16, no. 1, 2010, (Open Source Center, no. KPP20100409024001).
93. “Contingency Plan,” Korea Herald, 3 November 2009.
94. Chang Soo-man, “China’s Development of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile and ROK-US Military Coopera-
tion,” Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, ROK Angle: Korea’s Defense Policy, Issue 45, February 2011. 
95. “Northeast Asia May Become ‘Tinderbox’ Amid PRC Military Build-up,” Chosun Ilbo, 14 January 2011.
96. David Kang, “Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea’s Response to China,” Journal of East
Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, Jan-Apr 2009, and Jayshree Bajoria, “Countering China’s Military Modern-
ization,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, February 2009, www.cfr.org/china/countering-
chinas-military-modernization/p9052 (consulted on 30 November 2011).
97. BBC Global Poll, “Rising Concern about China’s Increasing Power: Global Poll,” 27 March 2011,
www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCChina_Mar11_rpt.pdf (consulted on 30 November
2011).
98. Kang Hyun-kyung, “Half of Koreans say China’s Image Deteriorated,” Korea Times, 31 December 2010.
99. Cited in Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “US-Korea Relations: Under the Shadow of 2010,” Comparative Con-
nections, vol. 13, no. 1, April 2011.
Special feature
military advantage over China, however, the MSDF suffers from a quanti-
tative disadvantage that will challenge it in its new, more active role. With
a weak economy and the aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake to con-
tend with, policymakers will have limited resources to devote to defence.
Tokyo is hoping to overcome this by investing in partnerships, particularly
with the US, and the alliance remains on solid footing. With concern about
China among Japanese academics and the public on the rise, pressure will
persist on Japanese politicians to continue Japan’s security transformation.
Still, lingering questions over the long-term viability of the US deterrent
and continued turmoil in Japanese politics and its economy could frustrate
Tokyo’s long-term security ambitions.
Although physically far afield from China, Australian worries that China’s
military modernisation could upset the regional balance have increased,
and policymakers do not want to be caught unprepared. Recent official de-
fence reviews have noted the desirability of building friendly relations with
China, while also hedging by boosting ties with the US and other regional
partners. To enhance prospects for a continuing robust US regional pres-
ence over the long term, Canberra is planning to increase US access to Aus-
tralian bases. Australian academics and the public are still unsure of what
to make of China, however. While there is general receptivity to the idea of
cooperation with regional partners, not all are convinced that Australia
needs to commence expensive military investments. The pace and scale of
Australia’s reaction will depend heavily on events in the Asia-Pacific region
in the coming decade, particularly the state of US-China relations.
South Korea’s security strategy remains heavily geared towards a North
Korean contingency. China’s military modernisation has not escaped no-
tice, however, with some worrying that Beijing could block a favourable
outcome in the event of a Korean contingency. South Korea launched a
major military modernisation program in the middle of last decade that
was meant to equip the country to address other regional threats. This am-
bitious program has been scaled back, however, and the more advanced
military capabilities that would be needed to confront China have given
way to those that would assist US forces in a conflict with North Korea.
South Korea has sought to revitalise its alliance with the US and is hoping
that the US can continue to provide a credible deterring presence to po-
tential aggressors. Yet South Koreans also seek to avoid exacerbating ten-
sions with China and therefore do not favour forms of cooperation with
the US that could be perceived by Beijing as threatening. South Korea’s se-
curity strategy in the coming decades will likely be shaped primarily by
inter-Korean affairs, although its focus could shift more towards China, par-
ticularly if Seoul sees China as negatively affecting inter-Korean relations.
Various internal and external factors will affect the pace and scale of fu-
ture Japanese, Australian, and Korean responses to the modernisation of
China’s military, including domestic politics in each country, economic sus-
tainability, and unpredictable developments such as natural disasters. Yet
even more important will be Chinese diplomatic and military behaviour
and perceptions of American power. Benign Chinese policies will assuage
concerns throughout the region about China’s military, while repeats of in-
cidents such as the September 2010 Senkaku row will fuel insecurity. Con-
fidence in the US ability to maintain its security commitments in the re-
gion will encourage all three countries to forego independent responses or
accommodations to Chinese military power that could be destabilising.
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